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Johanna R. Shargel
Because of gender-based violence, American women and girls are
relegated to a form of second-class citizenship.... When half of our
citizens are not safe at home or on the streets because of their sex,
our entire society is diminished.
-Sally Goldfarb, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund'
Violence currently poses the most significant threat to women's rights as
equal citizens. The Senate Judiciary Committee, after reviewing a wide array
of studies on violence against women in the United States, reported that
"[v]iolence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more
common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined."2
Violence against women occurs with disturbing frequency and results in
severe, often fatal, injuries. A recent Department of Justice survey reported
that, in total, women aged twelve and older annually sustain almost five
million violent victimizations; 3 approximately five hundred thousand of these
victimizations are rapes and sexual assaults.4  Rape in America,5  a
1. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearings on H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm. on Civi
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 103d Cong. 7-8 (1993) [hereinafter Crimes
of Violence] (statement of Sally Goldfarb. Senior Staff Atorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
2. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
3. See RoNET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 2 (1995). According to the Nauonal Cnmc
Victimization Survey (NCVS), "violent victimizations" include homicide, rape/sexual assault. robber).
aggravated assault, and simple assault. See id.
4. See id. Note that the 1995 NCVS implemented significant methodological changes pursuant to an
extensive 10-year redesign project aimed at producing more accurate reporting of incidents of rape and
sexual assault. See id. at 1.
5. NATIONAL VIcnm CENTER & CRIME VIcTIMS R.ESFAR(H AND TREATtE-r CENTER. RAPE IN
AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA]
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comprehensive national study, found that one out of every eight adult women
has been the victim of forcible rape at some point in her lifetime.6
Until recently, women victimized by the reality or threat of violence were
left without an effective remedy, and therefore denied their right to full and
equal citizenship. First, the disabling physical and psychological effects of
violence have kept women from participating as commercial actors, and their
absence from the nation's marketplace has had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Women have, in Goldfarb's words, been "relegated to a form of
second-class citizenship" because violence has prevented them from
contributing to the national economy on an equal footing with men.7 Women
have also been "relegated to a form of second-class citizenship" because state
criminal justice systems have frequently denied female victims of violence
their right to equal protection of the laws.8 Because both the restrictive letter
and the biased implementation of state laws have failed to keep women "safe
at home or on the streets," women continually have been deprived of their full
citizenship rights.
In September 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), 9 drafted in response to what its chief legislative sponsor, Senator
Joseph R. Biden, called a "national tragedy."' 0 The law evolved gradually
over a four-year period during which Congress heard testimony from women's
rights and civil rights organizations, state attorneys general, law professors, law
enforcement officials, physicians, and victims of violence. What emerged from
this expert testimony is a comprehensive statute containing a wide range of
provisions designed to address the pressing problem of violence against
women.
For example, to improve overall safety for women, the VAWA increases
penalties for federal rape convictions and provides state grants to support law
enforcement and educational efforts aimed at reducing violent crime against
women." With respect to domestic violence, the Act criminalizes interstate
domestic violence, 12 and ensures that a protective order issued in one state is
given "full faith and credit" in all other states. 3 In an effort to achieve equal
justice for women in the courts, the Act authorizes grants to improve the
training of judges who deal with issues involving domestic violence and also
encourages circuit judicial councils to conduct gender bias studies. 4
6. See id. at 2.
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. See infra Section H.A.
9. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.). The bill was enacted as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322.
10. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
il. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (1994).
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (1994).
13. See id. § 2265.
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-4002.
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Without question, the most controversial provision of the VAWA is the
section entitled "Civil Rights for Women."'' 5 This provision establishes a
federal civil rights cause of action for victims of violent crimes "motivated by
gender."' 6 The Civil Rights Remedy defines a violent crime as any act that
would be a federal or state felony, whether or not the offense has actually
resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction.' 7 Under the statute,
a person who commits a crime of gender-motivated violence, whether a public
or private actor, is liable to the injured party and subject to compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief."8
The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is based on two independent
constitutional sources of legislative authority: the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provision, Section Five. Since the
Remedy was passed, two federal district courts have considered challenges to
15. Id. § 13981. For a description of the controversy surrounding the VAWA Rcmed) 's enactment.
see Victoria F. Nourse, The Violence Against Wbmen Act: A Legislanve History. i VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: LAW & PRACnCE (forthcoming Mar. 1997) (manuscnpt at 37-40. on file with the Yale Law
Journal). Nourse explains that opposition arose primarily from federal and state judges. including Chief
Justice William Rehnquist. See id. at 37-38. For the most part. critics warned that the Remedy would
"flood" federal courts with claims of gender-motivated violence. See. e.g.. REPORT OF THE JUItCIAL
CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON GENDER-BASED VioiENcE 6 (1991). It is highly unlikely, however.
that this concern would ever materialize. First, virtually every statistical study on violence against women
has found that it is vastly underreported. See. e.g.. RAPE tN AMERICA. supra note 5. at 6 (estimating that
only 16% of all rapes are ever reported). Furthermore, sexual assault claims currently represent only a small
fraction of all civil cases filed. See Crimes of Violence, supra note I. at II (statement of Sally Goldfarb.
Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) (citing study by Jury v'erdict Research.
Inc., reporting only 255 civil jury trials in sex assault cases over 10-year penod).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 13981. According to the statute, a gender-motivated crime is "committed because of
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id.
§ 13981(d)(1). The injured party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the cnme was
motivated by gender. See id. § 13981(e)(1). To date, there have been no final judgments on claims brought
under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, and so no court has yet ruled on the meaning of the term "gender-
motivated." Many feminist legal scholars interpreting the VAWA Remedy posit that the large majority of
violent crimes against women are gender-motivated. See. e.g., Birgit Schmidt Am Busch. Domestic Violence
and 7Title Iff of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique. 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 13-19 (1995) (arguing that courts should create rebuttable presumption that crime was gender-motivated).
W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Iicunms. 68 INO.
LJ. 577, 579 (1993) (maintaining that sexual assault and domestic violence are crimes predonunantly
motivated by gender). Moreover, an early version of the VAWA Remedy incorporated the presumption that
crimes of violence against women are gender-motivated. See Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History; Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L &
POL'Y 391, 396 (1995) (quoting H.R 1502. 102d Cong. (1991)). This Note adopts this view. and therefore
uses the phrases "violence against women" and "gender-motivated violence" interchangeably throughout.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the only case to date to invalidate the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Universirn. 935 F Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), also
used the terms "violence against women" and "gender-mouvated violence" interchangeably. Compare. e.g.
id. at 789 ("[C]ongressional findings which support that violence against women affects interstate commerce
are currently before this Court."), with id. at 800 ("Congress's purpose to remedy discnmination by prvate
individuals who commit gender-based violent crime against a woman is an illegitimate Fourteenth
Amendment end .... ).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2). If there has not been a cnminal conviction. "the ciil nghts action
will involve a hearing in which the elements of the felony must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence." Julie Goldscheid & Susan J. Kraham. Act Provides Civil Remedy for Violence. NAT'L i . May
1, 1995, at B9, B10.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
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the constitutional validity of the statute, ruling in opposite directions. In Doe
v. Doe,19 a Connecticut district court upheld the Remedy, concluding that it
constitutes a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.20 Only one month later, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic &
State University,2' a Virginia district court invalidated the VAWA civil rights
law, holding that the enactment exceeds Congress's authority under both the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
This Note defends the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy, which is currently mired in controversy and doctrinal confusion. Part
I examines the Commerce Clause ground of the Remedy, focusing on United
States v. Lopez,' a postenactment Supreme Court decision that, in another
context, narrowed Congress's commerce power, thereby raising questions about
the constitutional legitimacy of the VAWA Remedy. Part II analyzes the
Section Five basis for the Remedy, arguing against claims that the statute fails
to meet the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. Although the
constitutional attacks on the VAWA civil rights law are formidable,
particularly with respect to the Commerce Clause, this Note concludes that the
case law interpreting both constitutional provisions largely supports the
Remedy's legitimacy on both interstate commerce and equal protection
grounds.
I. SURVIVING LOPEZ: THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT OF GENDER-MOTIVATED
VIOLENCE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In 1994, when the Violence Against Women Act was passed, the
Commerce Clause appeared to be a sound basis for congressional action.24
The Supreme Court had not invalidated legislation relying on the Commerce
Clause in nearly sixty years,25 and case law consistently granted tremendous
deference to congressional regulations designed to protect interstate
commerce. 26 In 1995, however, the Lopez Court struck down a statute with
a tenuous connection to interstate commerce, thereby redefining the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.27 Cautioning that Congress
19. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
20. See id. at 617.
21. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
22. See id. at 801.
23. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 8.
25. Before Lopez, the Court had not struck down a statute passed under the Commerce Clause since
1935, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549-50 (1935), except in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which was subsequently overruled in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
26. See infra Subsection I.B.1.
27. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
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would no longer have free rein in the commerce arena, the Lopez Court ruled
that unless the legislation pertained to the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, Congress would only be permitted to regulate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. "- In addition, the Lopez Court
frowned on the regulation of intrastate activity that lacks a concrete tie to
interstate commerce; it also viewed with disapproval legislation that targets
noncommercial activity. Lopez, however, is a deeply ambiguous opinion that
has generated a considerable amount of doctrinal uncertainty both in lower
courts and among academic commentators.
This Part analyzes the impact of Lopez on Commerce Clause jurisprudence
in general and on the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy in
particular. It concludes that although Lopez poses a number of troubling
questions and casts some doubt on Congress's authority to enact the VAWA
Remedy, the Remedy will most likely survive Lopez.-9 The first Section of
this Part examines the damaging effect of gender-motivated violence on
interstate commerce. The second Section analyzes the Lopez decision and its
impact on the otherwise uniformly deferential Commerce Clause case law of
the modern era and concludes that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy remains
well-grounded in the Commerce Clause.
A. Violence Against Women: A Well-Documented and Substantial Threat to
Interstate Commerce
Voluminous testimony at the congressional hearings on the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy evidenced the tremendous strain that violence against women
imposes on the nation's productive capacity, clearly demonstrating that gender-
motivated violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As the
Senate Judiciary Committee summarized: "'Gender-based crimes and the fear
of gender-based crimes restrict movement, reduce employment opportunities,
increase health expenditures, and reduce consumer spending, all of which
affect interstate commerce and the national economy."30 Extensive
congressional findings and other studies demonstrate that gender-motivated
violence has a detrimental effect on interstate commerce.
First, gender-motivated violence severely limits women's contribution to
the national economy. Over thirty years ago, when enacting Title VII of the
28. The Lopez Court promulgated this standard as a clarification of its earlier case law, which, by its
own admission, "ha[d] not been clear whether an activity must *affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate
commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1630
29. A note recently published in the Columbia Law Review analyzes the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
in light of Lopez and determines that the Remedy still constitutes a legitimate exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers. See Kerrie E. Maloney. Note, Gender-MAoivated Violence and the Commerce
Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez. 96 COLUst. L REV
1876 (1996).
30. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991).
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1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress sought to guarantee equal opportunity for
women in employment.3' Gender-motivated violence, however, defeats the
purpose and benefit of Title VII; it physically prevents millions of American
women from full participation in commercial activity. Domestic violence in
particular significantly impairs job performance: Victims of domestic violence
are often harassed by their batterers at work, prevented from arriving to work
on time, and kept from attending work altogether because of serious
injuries.32 Moreover, the threat of violence affects women's employment
decisions and conduct to a large extent: Fear of violence deters women from
applying for or accepting job positions in unsafe neighborhoods, and it
discourages women from working after dark or on weekends. 33 The fear and
threat of violence affect every American woman and therefore have both an
inevitable and an enormous impact on interstate commerce.
Gender-motivated violence not only deprives women of employment
opportunities, but also has a significant effect on business nationwide. At the
VAWA congressional hearings, experts on abuse and legal scholars described
how gender-motivated violence depletes the nation's workforce. As New York
University law professor Burt Neuborne explained:
In pure economic terms, the sheer loss of productivity attributable to
violent gender-based assault is staggering .... The dislocation of the
nation's labor force that is caused by fear of violent gender-based
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994). Title VII, like the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, was based on
Congress's Commerce Clause power, recognizing that bias in the workplace creates a massive drain on the
nation's productive capacity. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Rep. Humphrey).
Because gender-motivated violence has a comparable impact on the national economy, the Civil Rights
Remedy should be sustained by the same logic. See Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of
Burt Neubome, Professor of Law, New York University) (analogizing Civil Rights Remedy to Title VII
and maintaining that Remedy is "equally supported by a need to eradicate the destructive effects of gender
bias from our economic system"); Nourse, supra note 15, at 6 ("Would a law guaranteeing equal pay mean
much to a woman whose husband beat her when she left the house? ... Violence against women . . . could
wipe out in a single blow any and every advance in opportunity created by over twenty years of law
reform."). Note, however, that it can be argued that Lopez drew a line between statutes like Title VII, which
directly regulate employment or economic activity, and statutes like the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy,
which regulate noncommercial conduct that affects interstate commerce. According to this broad reading
of Lopez, regulation of noncommercial, intrastate activity would be constitutionally impermissible. See infra
Section I.B.
32. See JODY RAPHAEL, TAYLOR INSTITUTE, PRISONERS OF ABUSE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
WELFARE REcEIpr 6-8, 15 (1990) (citing anecdotal and statistical evidence of effect of battering on
employment status of women); Melanie Shepard & Ellen Pence, The Effect of Battering on the Employment
Status of Women, 13 AFFILA 55, 58 (1988) (finding that one-quarter of battered women surveyed had lost
job due at least in part to effects of domestic violence, and over half were harassed by their abusers at
work); Connie Stanley, Domestic Violence: An Occupational Impact Study 17 (July 27, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (finding that over 70% of employed battered women are
subject to telephone harassment at work by their abusers; over 60% are late to work because of their
abuser-, over 50% miss work because of abuse; and 70% have difficulty performing their job because of
their abusive situation).
33. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 240-41 (1991) (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President,
National Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc.).
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assault is enormous: women who do not enter or who leave the labor
force because of fear; women whose choice of job is dictated by fear;
women whose performance on the job is affected by fear. 4
Due to the prevalence of violence against women, employers across the
country must contend with lost productivity, increased health-care and security
costs, and higher turnover.35
In addition to decreasing nationwide production, violence against women
also has a negative effect on levels of commercial consumption. As one
witness explained at the VAWA congressional hearings:
Women who cannot traverse public streets without fear will also
not use places of public accommodation, purchase goods, or conduct
business in such areas. Fear of gender-motivated violence restricts the
hours during which women can engage in a variety of activities and
seriously curtails their participation in the commerce of our nation.'
Whether analyzing the economic loss precipitated by gender-motivated
violence from the perspective of supply or demand, the conclusion is the same:
Gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce because women as a
group constitute approximately half the nation's consumers and producers. The
fact that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is rooted in the Commerce Clause
rightly acknowledges that when half the citizens of this country-half the
commercial actors-either fear or are subject to incapacitation by violence
because of their gender, the entire nation suffers.
B. United States v. Lopez: An Uncertain Legacy
As described in the previous Section, there is more than adequate data
demonstrating the significant costs of violence against women to support the
claim that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce.
34. Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Bun Neuborne. Professor of Law. New York
University); see also Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham. Protecting Iloimens Welfare in the Face of
Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1141, 1142-44 (1995) (explaining how violence prevents poor women
from participating in welfare-to-work programs and therefore prevents many women from obtaining and
maintaining employment); Jason DeParle, Welfare Mothers Find Jobs Are Easier to Get Than Hold. N.Y
TiMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at Al (noting that abusive boyfriends interfere with women's employment when the)
feel "threatened by the prospect of [the woman's] independence")
35. See, e.g., Hearing on Domestic Violence: Hearing on S. 596 Before the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 15 (1993) (statement of James Hardeman. Manager of Employee Assistance
Program, Polaroid Corp.); Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law. 28
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 383, 383-86 (1994) (documenting costs of violence against women in tcrms of
medical resources, employment, and law enforcement); The Billion Dollar Epidemic. Ast MED. NEWS, Jan.
6, 1992 (reporting that family violence costs nation about -S5 to Sl0 billion a year"); Milt Freudenheim.
Employers Act to Stop Family Violence, N.Y. TIMiES. Aug. 23. 1988. at AI; Joseph Pereira. Employers
Confront Domestic Abuse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2. 1995. at B I.
36. Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 109 (statement of James P. Turner. Acting Assistant Attorney
General of the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division).
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Turning to the relevant body of case law, the question becomes whether the
nexus between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce is
sufficiently close to meet the standards established in United States v.
Lopez,37 the Supreme Court's most recent and most restrictive formulation of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. In Lopez, the Court departed significantly
from its traditional approach to legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause, suggesting that Congress's commerce power is constrained by certain
limiting principles. Lopez, however, is an ambiguous case that raised more
questions than it answered. Since Lopez was decided, lower courts and
academic commentators have grappled with the issues presented by the
decision, and have reached contradictory conclusions. The doctrinal uncertainty
generated by Lopez is demonstrated by the fact that the two district courts that
have reviewed the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy after
Lopez have ruled in opposite directions.38 Although the Lopez Court offered
certain indications that it would regard specific types of congressional
regulation with less favor, it did not establish a rigid standard or bright-line
test for evaluating the validity of commerce legislation.39 Ultimately, the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy would fail only under the most expansive
reading of Lopez, a reading that does not seem to be the most plausible or
defensible construction of the case.
Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, an act that
made possession of a firearm in a school zone a federal offense.40 The Court
held that the statute exceeded Congress's commerce power because the
possession of firearms in school zones does not qualify as economic activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce.4 ' After reviewing the history
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in some detail, the Lopez Court identified
three broad categories of activity that Congress is permitted to regulate under
its commerce authority: first, "the use of the channels of interstate commerce";
second, "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce"; and third, "those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. 42 With respect to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
Court "quickly disposed" of the first two categories and focused its attention
on the third, finding that the possession of guns in local school zones does not
"substantially affect[] interstate commerce." 43 Recognizing that prior
Commerce Clause cases had granted "great deference to congressional action,"
37. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
39. The Lopez Court admitted: "[C]ongressional power under the Commerce C lause 'is necessarily one
of degree.' .. . These are not precise formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be." 115 S. Ct.
at 1633-34 (citation omitted).
40. See id. at 1626.
41. See id. at 1634.
42. Id. at 1629-30.
43. Id. at 1630-31.
1856 [Vol. 106: 1849
The Violence Against Women Act
the Lopez Court determined that it was time to distinguish between "what is
truly national and what is truly local."4' According to the Lopez Court, the
Gun-Free School Zones Act presented an ideal line-drawing opportunity, as the
Act apparently had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. ' 5
Lopez left two significant questions in its wake: whether legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause requires a jurisdictional element and
whether such legislation is restricted to the regulation of economic or
commercial activity. If future Supreme Court opinions resolve these questions
in accordance with the broadest possible reading of Lopez, the result could be
fatal to the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. The text of the Lopez opinion itself,
as well as its interpretation by lower courts and legal academics, however,
favor a more moderate reading of Lopez---one that would leave the VAWA
Remedy unscathed.
1. The Jurisdictional Element
With respect to the first open-ended and potentially damaging issue, the
necessity of a jurisdictional element, the Lopez Court was troubled by the fact
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act had "no express jurisdictional element
which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce.' '46 The specific facts of Lopez show the marked absence of a
concrete tie to interstate commerce: "Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce . . . "4 In reviewing the VAWA Remedy after Lopez, the Court
might similarly conclude that gender-motivated violence is principally local
conduct that lacks a cognizable tie to interstate commerce. At bottom, the Civil
Rights Remedy, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, does not contain a
jurisdictional element ensuring on a case-by-case basis that each alleged
violation of the Remedy affects interstate commerce."8 Under the Remedy,
prosecution may be brought in a case where neither the perpetrator nor the
victim has ever crossed a state line.
Some lower courts interpreting Lopez have emphasized the significance of
the jurisdictional element in determining whether a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. For example, in upholding the federal
44. Id. at 1634.
45. Id. at 1630-31.
46. Id. at 1631.
47. Id. at 1634.
48. The Brzonkala court emphasized this argument, maintaining that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, "does not have a junsdictional requirement himtung each individual
case under VAWA to situations involving interstate commerce." Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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carjacking statute against a post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenge, the Third
Circuit appeared to be influenced considerably by the fact that the carjacking
statute, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, "contains a 'jurisdictional
element' which ostensibly limits its application to activities substantially
related to interstate commerce."4 9 The court pointed out that the text of the
carjacking statute guaranteed the necessary interstate nexus by requiring proof
that the victim's motor vehicle "'ha[d] been transported, shipped or received
in interstate or foreign commerce."'
50
Other lower courts interpreting Lopez have utilized a looser, more flexible
approach to the jurisdictional element issue. For example, although the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)5' does not
contain a jurisdictional element within the text of the statute itself, six lower
courts reviewing the statute after Lopez have found that the statute includes the
requisite tie to interstate commerce.52 Courts defending FACE against Lopez
challenges have relied on the fact that "individuals travel interstate to obtain
and provide reproductive health services," so that the obstruction of those
services tangibly interferes with interstate commerce.53 In fact, courts have
noted that violence at clinics increases the necessity of interstate travel by
decreasing the availability of reproductive health services nationwide.' One
court reviewing a Commerce Clause challenge to FACE also found a viable
interstate nexus because "the effort to close reproductive health facilities is
organized on a national scale. 55 Because of this concrete evidence that the
provision of reproductive health services inherently contains a jurisdictional
element, that court concluded that clinic obstruction presents a "truly interstate
problem" rather than a "multistate, intrastate problem., 56
While the federal carjacking statute includes a literal jurisdictional element
and FACE contains a jurisdictional element in an interpretive sense, some
statutes ruled constitutional after Lopez do. not have jurisdictional ties at all.
For example, the Drug Free School Zones Act bears no textual mention of
interstate commerce and has been upheld by several circuits after Lopez."
49. United States v. Bishop, 66 E3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995);
accord United States v. Robinson, 62 E3d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547,
550 (9th Cir. 1995).
50. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 585 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-21 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 47 (1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D. Conn. 1996); United States
v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1423-24 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423,
1433-34 (CD. Cal. 1995).
53. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 681.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. Id. at 683.
56. Id.
57. See United States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d
1135, 1139-41 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1996). Other post-
Lopez cases and commentary indicate that a jurisdictional element is not a prerequisite of constitutionality.
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Furthermore, none of the courts upholding the Drug Free School Zones Act
has even attempted to construct a quasi-jurisdictional element in the way that
courts upholding FACE have done. Evidently, there is widespread uncertainty
over what constitutes a jurisdictional element, and whether one is necessary to
pass constitutional muster after Lopez. As the Bronkala court pointed out, "it
is unclear whether such a jurisdictional requirement is needed."5'
Prior to Lopez, the concept of a jurisdictional element did not present itself
in Commerce Clause case law. Over the past sixty years, in a series of highly
deferential decisions, the Court allowed Congress free rein to regulate purely
intrastate activity as long as that activity had a sufficient effect on interstate
commerce when considered in the aggregate. 59 Although Lopez, with its
explicit reference to a jurisdictional element, appears to have introduced a
more stringent standard for determining whether the activity at issue has an
adequate interstate nexus, the Court also specifically noted that its decision
would preserve Commerce Clause precedent in its entirety. The final passage
in Lopez clearly states that the Court simply declined "to proceed any further"
down the road toward granting Congress "general police power.' 6" The Lopez
Court therefore expressed only an intent to limit the expansion of congressional
commerce power, not an intent to retract authority granted to Congress in
previous cases. Because the Lopez opinion claims to be in harmony with a
long lineage of deferential Commerce Clause cases, it is these cases that must
be brought to bear in interpreting Lopez and in determining the extent to which
a jurisdictional element or interstate nexus will be required of legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Conn. 1995) (upholding statute prohibiting sale
or transfer of firearm to felon); United States v. Gonzalez. 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding
drug distribution statute); see also Maloney, supra note 29. at 1932 ("]he Lopez Court did not announce
that every future statute must contain a jurisdictional element.").
58. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University. 935 F. Supp. 779. 792 (W.D. Va. 1996).
59. See cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 61-81. Many post-Lopez law, review articles
describe how Lopez broke with a half-century tradition of deferential Commerce Clause case law. See. e.g.
Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and the Federalization of Cnrmial Law. 98 W. VA. L REv. 815, 819 (1996)
("In United States v. Lopez, for the first time in nearly six decades, the judiciary reasserted itself.-). Stephen
Christopher Likes, Casenote, An Utter Disregard for Precedent: Misconstruing Commerce Clause Precedent
in United States v. Lopez, 29 CREIGH'roN L. REv. 811, 843 (1996) (analyzing Lopez in light of fact that
"[f]or almost sixty years, the Court has taken a 'hands--off approach to regulations promulgated under the
Commerce Clause .... ).
60. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (citation omitted): see also id. at 1636-37 (Kennedy. J.. concurrng)
(concluding, after reviewing history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. that major precedents -are not
called in question by our decision today"). Even Justice Thomas. whose concurring opinion rued the
"wrong turn" the Court took in the 1930s, conceded that many believe "it is too late in the day to undertake
a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare dectiss and reliance interests may
convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean." Id. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas. J., concumng). It is also w'orth
noting that a Seventh Circuit post-Lopez decision upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
against a Lopez challenge concluded that, "the Supreme Court reaffirmed, rather than overturned. the
previous half century of Commerce Clause precedent in Lopez.... Because the Supreme Court left intact
Jones & Laughlin and all its progeny ... it obviously did not intend Lope: to be a departure from
established Commerce Clause precedent." Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685.
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The Court's generous, hands-off approach to Congress's Commerce Clause
authority began in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,61 a
decision upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.62 On its face,
the Act regulated purely intrastate activity; its aim was to protect the rights of
employees to unionize. Nevertheless, the Court found that the local
manufacturing operations of the Pennsylvania steel company at issue, a
company that received raw materials from other states and shipped finished
products interstate, had "such a close and intimate relation to interstate
commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most
urgent national concern. 63 Extending exceptionally broad power to Congress,
the Court explained that the commerce authority "is not limited to transactions
which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign
commerce." 64 According to the Jones & Laughlin Steel Court, Congress is
free to regulate an intrastate activity outside the regular flow of interstate
commerce as long as the activity has a "close and substantial relation" to
interstate commerce, and its regulation is necessary to protect interstate
commerce against "burdens and obstructions." 65
In cases following Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court continued to blur the
distinction between interstate and intrastate activity, granting ever-increasing
power to Congress to regulate intrastate activity. In United States v. Darby,66
for example, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, an act
prohibiting the interstate shipment of commodities produced under labor
conditions that violate certain federal standards. A unanimous Court held that
Congress is permitted to regulate local labor conditions, a purely intrastate
subject, so long as the finished product would ultimately be sold interstate.67
The Court further held that even where only a portion of goods produced is
intended for interstate commerce, Congress may still regulate the entire
industry because products intended for interstate commerce are, in practice,
inseparable from products intended for intrastate commerce. Like the Jones &
Laughlin Steel Court before it, the Darby Court rendered the line between
interstate and intrastate activity virtually indistinct, approving federal regulation
of intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce in a broad
sense.
In Wickard v. Filburn,68 the Court reached the high-water mark of its
deference to Congress's power to regulate intrastate activity under the
Commerce Clause. Wickard involved a challenge to the Agricultural
61. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
62. See id. at 30.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Ild. at 36.
65. Id. at 37.
66. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
67. See id. at 123.
68. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Adjustment Act of 1938,69 an act that imposed quotas on wheat to increase
its market price. The plaintiff in Wickard was an Ohio farmer who operated
a small dairy farm that produced wheat solely for consumption on the farm
itself.70 According to the Wickard plaintiff, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
as applied in his case, exceeded Congress's commerce power because it
regulated activities "local in character" that had only an "indirect" effect on
interstate commerce.7' Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Jackson
rejected the plaintiff's challenge to the Act, reasoning that the fact that the
plaintiff's "own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself
is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial. 72 While the Darby Court had held that Congress
could control intrastate activity where it is "inseparable" from interstate
activity, the Wickard Court took Congress's power one step further and held
that Congress could regulate purely intrastate activity-here, a farmer's
consumption of his own homegrown wheat-because that activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate. 3
Looking to the permissive holdings of Jones & Laughlin Steel and its
progeny, which indicated that the Court was prepared to accord Congress
substantial freedom to regulate intrastate activity, Congress decided to rely on
the Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis for Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Title II prohibits racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation, and Congress maintained that such discrimination threatens
and substantially affects interstate commerce.74 When Title II was being
considered by Congress, several senators charged that if the law were enacted,
the Commerce Clause would be distorted beyond any recognizable limit; they
argued that the federal government should not involve itself in the regulation
of activities that are primarily intrastate in nature. Senator Monroney of
Oklahoma, for example, found it "rather difficult to stretch the clause to cover
an eating place simply because some of the meat moves from one state into
another; or because the vegetables they serve come from Florida, or the
oranges come from California." 75 The Court, however, was not troubled by
69. See id- at 113.
70. See id. at 114-15.
71. Id. at 119.
72. Id. at 127-28.
73. The Lopez Court clearly adopted MWckard's "in the aggregate" reasoning as part and parcel of its
"substantial effects" test. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. 1634 (1995) ("The possession of
a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elfsenhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.") (emphasis added).
74. Title II provides: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods.
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race. color, religion, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
75. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 150 (12th ed. 1991) (quoting Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., pts. I & 2 (statement of Sen. Monroney)). Man)
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the intrastate character of the discriminatory conduct regulated by Title II and
upheld the statute in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States76 and a
companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung, reasoning that racial
discrimination by business establishments, considered in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce. Because these two decisions involve
a civil rights law, unlike the Jones & Laughlin Steel line of cases, they directly
pertain to a determination of whether the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy has a
sufficient interstate nexus.
Heart of Atlanta Motel held that a motel cannot refuse to lodge blacks on
the basis of race and established that however local the motel's operations
might seem, "discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel. 78
In upholding Title H of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Heart of Atlanta Motel
Court set forth a highly deferential standard to determine whether legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause is constitutionally sound. The proper two-
part test, the Court explained, is "(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for
finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it
congressmen and legal scholars protested at the time that Title II should be based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. For example, Professor Gerald Gunther wrote:
The aim of the proposed anti-discrimination legislation, I take it, is quite unrelated to any
concern with national commerce in any substantive sense.
It would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce clause to invoke it
as the basis for this legislation.... [I] would much prefer to see the Government channel its
resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the development of a viable interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the provision with a natural linkage to the race problem. That would
seem to me a considerably less demeaning task than the construction of an artificial commerce
facade ....
Id. at 149 (quoting Letter from Gerald Gunther, Law Professor, Stanford University, to the Department of
Justice (June 5, 1963)). Ultimately, Congress relied exclusively on the Commerce Clause, reasoning that
to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment would create unnecessary risks. As Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy explained: ."inhere is an injustice that needs to be remedied. We have to find the tools with
which to remedy that injustice."' Id. It is important to recognize, however, that Congress determined that
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment would invite constitutional challenges to Title II two years before
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1964), the most significant and expansive Section Five case of the
modem era, had been decided. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
Echoing the debate over Title II, the argument has been made that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
is fundamentally about securing women's equal protection under the laws, and is "unrelated to any concern
with national commerce in any substantive sense." See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence,
Relationship, and Equality Meet: A Legislative History of the Violence Against Women's Civil Rights
Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22 (1996) ("There is no question, of course, that Congress was aiming
at discriminatory violence rather than the commerce itself."). Although this position has some merit, this
Note grants both constitutional bases of the Remedy equal attention and respect because in relying on the
Commerce Clause, Congress took the important step of acknowledging and underscoring the effects of
gender-motivated violence on the public, commercial realm. With the VAWA Remedy in existence, gender-
motivated violence can no longer be viewed as a private, hidden issue that state justice systems, see infra
Section II.A, and even other civil rights laws, see infra text accompanying notes 176-79, have failed to
address; the Remedy recharacterizes violence against women as a problem that negatively affects the most
public of all spaces, the commercial marketplace, because women are essential to its operation, Therefore,
the VAWA Remedy's Commerce Clause basis is not simply a constitutional hook on which to hang the
legislation, but a significant statement about women's status and importance as commercial actors and
citizens.
76. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
77. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
78. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253.
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had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are
reasonable and appropriate. 79
The Court applied the "rational basis" test again in McClung, which also
involved a challenge to Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The defendant
owned and operated a family restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, and refused to serve
black patrons in the dining area. After reviewing the legislative history of Title
II, the Court again deferred to Congress's determination that the legislation
was a rational means of protecting interstate commerce8W As applied to
Ollie's Barbecue, the Court concluded that Congress could reasonably have
found that "established restaurants ... sold less interstate goods because of the
discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, that business
in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing
there as a result."8 As in Wickard and preceding cases, the Court in both
Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung was undeterred by the fact that the
commercial establishments at issue in those cases served intrastate as well as
interstate customers. The critical factor in both decisions was that the
aggregate impact of the alleged racial discrimination substantially affected
interstate commerce.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence before Lopez, from Jones & Laughlin
Steel to McClung, uniformly established that Congress is free to regulate
intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when
considered in the aggregate. Since these cases were not overruled by Lopez,
the decisions lend support to the position that an actual jurisdictional element
is not a prerequisite for the legitimate exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power. Against the background of these cases, it is likely that Lopez
does not mandate a jurisdictional element as a new requirement for Congress
to follow. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, therefore, most likely will not be
invalidated because of the absence of a jurisdictional tie. Because Congress
demonstrated that gender-motivated violence has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate, 2 there is a sufficient
interstate nexus even by Lopez standards.
2. The Regulation of Cormnercial Activity
The second unresolved question raised by Lopez is whether Congress is
permitted under the Commerce Clause to regulate noneconomic activity. If
79. Id. at 258-59.
80. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04. For other Commerce Clause cases using the -ratonal basis
test, see Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n. 494 U.S. 1. 17 (1990): and Hode! %: Virgmna Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264. 276 (1981).
81. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300.
82. See supra Section I.A. As mentioned above. Lopez clearly sustained Wickartfs -in the aggregate-
test. See supra note 73.
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Lopez stands for the proposition that noneconomic intrastate
activity-including activity that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce--cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause, the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy will certainly be invalidated. The question of whether a
regulated activity must be commercial in nature is more difficult to resolve
than the necessity of a jurisdictional element because even the deferential (and
still operative) Commerce Clause case law discussed above involves statutes
that directly regulate commercial activity. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
regulates business establishments, 3 and the Jones & Laughlin Steel line of
cases deal with statutes that pertain to economic matters such as manufacturing
operations, labor conditions, and wheat production and consumption. 4
Therefore, although these cases are relevant after Lopez, they do not help
answer the second troubling question raised by Lopez: Can a noneconomic
intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, such as gender-
motivated violence, be regulated under the Commerce Clause?
The Lopez opinion seemed in large part to be driven by the fact that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act did not directly involve economic activity, and
therefore the Act could not be upheld as a "regulation[] of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. '8 5 Apparently drawing
a distinction between economic and noneconomic activity, 6 the Lopez Court
provoked the following inquiries: What constitutes economic activity? Do
commercial activities only encompass the provision of goods and services? Or
can Congress regulate activities that are so closely tied to market transactions
that they substantially affect commerce? Without directly answering these
questions, the Lopez Court offered multiple and contradictory signals regarding
what it considered to be permissible regulation. 7 In fact, the Lopez Court
83. Recall, however, that those who criticized Congress's invocation of the Commerce Clause in
support of Title II would not have framed racial discrimination by places of public accommodation as an
economic problem, but rather as a moral issue governed by Fourteenth Amendment concems with equality
and citizenship. See supra note 75.
84. Although the Lopez Court characterized the production and consumption of homegrown wheat at
issue in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as economic activity, see United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995), it is interesting to note, as Justice Breyer did in his Lopez dissent, that the
Wickard Court itself did not focus on the commercial nature of the regulated activity. As Justice Breyer
explained, "the Wickard Court expressly held that Wickard's consumption of home-grown wheat, 'though
it may not be regarded as commerce,' could nevertheless be regulated-'whatever its nature'-so long as
'it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."' Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125). As mentioned above, the Lopez Court explicitly left Wickard in place.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
85. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added).
86. Note that the Lopez Court used the terms "commercial" and "economic" interchangeably. Compare.
e.g., id. at 1633 ("Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or
noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty."), with id. at 1634 ("The possession of a gun
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might ... substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.").
87. Compare id. at 1631 (approving "regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with
a commercial transaction"), with id. at 1633 (explaining that Congress may "regulate numerous commercial
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openly admitted that "a determination whether an intrastate activity is
commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal
uncertainty." 8
8
The weight of the evidence, however, points to the conclusion that after
Lopez, Congress is still free to regulate noncommercial activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. The large majority of legal
academics considering the question has adopted this moderate reading of
Lopez, maintaining that Lopez did not draw a bright line between the
regulation of economic and noneconomic activity.89 Furthermore, lower courts
following Lopez have taken this less strict approach, approving the regulation
of noncommercial activities that, in the words of the Lopez majority, "arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction." 9 Several federal
appellate courts, for example, have upheld the federal arson statute against
claims that it does not survive Lopez, reasoning that although the statute "does
not regulate commercial or economic activity, it does regulate the damage or
destruction of business property that satisfies the requisite interstate nexus."9'
Like arson, gender-motivated violence, though only indirectly linked to
commerce, has a substantial effect on economic activity. After all, when
women are assaulted in their homes, or when their work choices are
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce").
88. Id. at 1633.
89. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause- ife After Lopez. 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 801 (1996) (maintaining that noncommercial, intrastate activity that adversely affects
economic enterprise engaged in interstate commerce is still subject to Commerce Clause junsdicuon after
Lopez); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism. 46 CASE W. RES. L RE . 643. 648 (1996) (cnticizing
Lopez Court's attempt to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial activities as leading to
"absurd" conclusions); Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalhsm. 22 Ws. MrrCHELL L REv 71. 96 (1996)
(arguing that if Court had intended to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial activity, it would
probably have explicitly "announce[d] such a dramatic change in the law"); Donald H. Zeigler. The New,
Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1397 (1996) ("ITIhe commercial-noncommercial distinction is
reminiscent of the content-based or subject matter distinctions that the Court used in an earlier era and
abandoned as unworkable."); Maloney, supra note 29, at 1918 (-The best interpretation of Lope- is that
the regulated activity must be tied in some way to economic activity."): John M. Scott. Note. 18 U. ARK
LrTLE ROCK L.J. 513, 530 (1996) ("The Court did not clarify whether it will allow Congress to regulate
noncommercial activities to protect interstate commerce."). But see Anne C. Dailey. Federalism and
Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1817 (1995) ("Mhe Court removed noneconomic local
activity-whatever its effect on interstate commerce-from the scope of federal regulatory power.").
90. 115 S. Ct. at 1631. See, e.g., United States v. WVilson. 73 F.3d 675. 685 (7th Cir 1995) ("(VW)e
find no support for reading Lopez as permitting only regulation of economic activities exclusi'e of
regulations that reach or affect economic activities. The Court's language is clear that the substantial effects
test is not so limited ....").
91. United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1245 (lst Cir. 1996) (citation omitted): see also United
States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lopez challenge to federal arson statute)
Although the federal arson statute has been upheld by lower courts after Lopez despite the fact that it
regulates noncommercial activity, it is important to note that the statute does contain a junsdictional
element that ensures an interstate nexus. The statute provides: "Whoer maliciously damages or
destroys ... any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate
or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and not more than twenty years. fined
under this title, or both .... 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
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constrained by fear for their own safety, there is a tangible effect on the
operations of the national economy.92
Not only is it evident that the VAWA Remedy is analogous to the federal
arson statute, which has been upheld by lower courts after Lopez, but also it
can be argued that the economic effect of gender-motivated violence is more
direct, immediate, and substantial93 than the economic impact of permitting
guns in school zones. The VAWA Remedy, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, would not require that the Court "pile inference upon inference"'94 in
order to find a substantial link to interstate commerce. In Lopez, the
Government maintained in its brief that "the presence of guns in schools poses
a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning
environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less
productive citizenry." 95 This reasoning entails several levels of conjecture and
hypothesis: The possession of firearms in schools may cripple the educational
process; a "handicapped educational process" may result in a "less productive
citizenry"; and finally, a "less productive citizenry" may have "an adverse
effect on the Nation's economic well-being." 96 Unlike the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, which regulates activity that might lead to violent crime, the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy targets violent crime, gender-motivated violence,
directly. Moreover, gender-motivated violence has a necessary and substantial,
not a tenuous or speculative, connection to interstate commerce. Gender-
motivated violence directly prevents women from participating in the
workforce; it has an immediate and measurable effect on national
productivity.97 Even the Brzonkala court, while striking down the Civil Rights
Remedy on Commerce Clause grounds, conceded that "the case at hand
possibly involves one less step than the postulated effects in Lopez."98
3. The Gun-Free School Zones Act Distinguished
Whether or not the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy survives Lopez depends
in large part on how the jurisdictional element requirement is construed, and
on how the commercial/noncommercial distinction plays itself out in future
cases. Beyond these two central questions, however, there are several
additional ways of distinguishing the VAWA Remedy from the Gun-Free
School Zones Act struck down in Lopez.
92. See supra Section I.A.
93. The Lopez Court describes the Gun-Free School Zones Act as too tenuously related to interstate
commerce, see 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33, but never defines or elaborates on its "substantial effects" test.
94. Id. at 1634.
95. Id. at 1632.
96. Id.
97. See supra Section I.A.
98. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 790 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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First, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is distinguishable from the Gun-
Free School Zones Act because it does not invade areas of law traditionally
reserved for state regulation. The Lopez Court expressed concern that if the
Gun-Free School Zones Act were upheld, Congress's Commerce Clause power
would be virtually unlimited, and the delicate balance between state and
federal jurisdiction would be disturbed." The Court specifically identified
"education," "family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody)," and
"criminal law enforcement" as areas "where States historically have been
sovereign."'tt ° If Lopez did impose new restraints on Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause, it seems likely that this restraint will manifest
itself in terms of closer scrutiny of legislation involving these three targeted
areas. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, however, leaves all three traditional
areas of state sovereignty untouched.'0 ' The Remedy obviously does not
involve education and cannot be considered a "family law" for two important
reasons. First, its scope is not restricted to domestic relations; it regulates
gender-motivated violence regardless of whether the perpetrator is related to
the victim. Second, the Remedy expressly excludes "any State law claim
seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of
marital property, or child custody decree."'' 02 Therefore, the VAWA Remedy
excepts the precise areas the Lopez Court defined as family law, namely
"marriage, divorce, and child custody."'0 3
Perhaps even more importantly, the VAWA Remedy is a civil rights law,
not a criminal statute.'O° This fact is significant because the Lopez Court
repeatedly and emphatically underscored the fact that "'[s]tates possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."" 05 In contrast with
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not
interfere with states' power to govern themselves or to prescribe their own
criminal laws. Underscoring the inadequacy of remedies available at the state
level, the Remedy merely offers an alternative way for victims of gender-
motivated violence to be compensated for their injuries. As the Connecticut
99. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments. we are hard.
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate ')
100. 1&
101. See Maloney, supra note 29, at 1927-28.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
103. In opposing the Civil Rights Remedy during the VAWA congressional hearings, the Confecnce
of Chief Justices took the opposite view, maintaining that the Remedy "would impair the ability of state
courts to manage criminal and family law matters traditionally entrusted to the states." Crimes of Violence.
supra note 1, at 83 (statement of Conference of Chief Justices) (emphasis added).
104. Note that many federal civil rights statutes in addition to Tile 1I of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
have been enacted and upheld under the Commerce Clause. See. e.g.. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226.
243 (1983) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U S. 445. 448
(1976) (1972 Amendments to Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act): Abbott v. Bragdon. 912 F. Supp 580.
592-94 (D. Me. 1995) (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990)
105. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619,635 (1993)) (citation
omitted); see also id. at 1634 (explaining that Gun-Free School Zones Act represents federal encroachment
on "the general police power of the sort retained by the States").
19971 1867
The Yale Law Journal
district court reasoned in Doe, the VAWA Remedy "does nothing to infringe
on a state's authority to arrest and prosecute an alleged batterer on applicable
criminal charges .... [N]othing in VAWA precludes a victim of domestic
violence from bringing a tort action in state court .... " Moreover, while
providing an alternative forum for victims of gender-motivated violence, the
Remedy exposes flaws in the state system's handling of such violence. Victoria
Nourse, one of the drafters of the Remedy, describes the Remedy as a
constructive learning device, a lesson for both state justice systems and the
public at large:
VAWA's remedy is ... a classic civil rights remedy: it does not
directly punish the State that has failed to prosecute acquaintance rape
cases or to arrest spouse abusers. Instead, it seeks to force courts to
address the reasons "why" those practices exist by exposing the very
same prejudices in the conduct subject to suit."
A "classic" civil rights law that educates and compensates in response to
failures in the state system is easily distinguished from the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, which coopted states' control over their own criminal laws.'
There is a second, equally significant, way to distinguish the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy from the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Lopez majority
noted its disapproval of the absence of congressional findings to support the
Government's claim that the possession of guns in school zones has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But
to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate
the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially
affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.'t 9
106. 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996). This passage highlights the contrast between the VAWA
Remedy and the Gun-Free School Zones Act which, as Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence,
"foreclose[d] the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States
lay claim by right of history and expertise .... Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. Nourse, supra note 15, at 18-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Other academic
commentators agree that the Civil Rights Remedy is an effective educational tool. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra
note 16, at 399 ("[Trhe civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act can be a powerful
instrument in the continuing effort to advance our understanding of what causes violence against women
and what we can do to stop it.").
108. However, the mere fact that a statute is criminal does not seem fatal even after Lopez. See, e.g.,
Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615 ("Notwithstanding Lopez's conclusion that 'states possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing criminal law,' dozens of courts throughout the country, post-Lopez, have upheld a
variety of federal criminal ... enactments as constitutional under the Commerce Clause ....") (citations
omitted). See generally Weaver, supra note 59 (describing evolution of federal criminal law and predicting
that Lopez would not jeopardize existing federal criminal statutes).
109. 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (citations omitted).
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As discussed in the previous Section, the VAWA Remedy, in contrast with the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, has a voluminous legislative history substantiating
the link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce." 0 This
record shows that Congress seriously deliberated on the factual and
constitutional issues that surrounded the Remedy's enactment; unlike the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, Congress did not merely assert its Commerce Clause
power without justification.
The question then becomes how much weight courts should accord these
congressional findings when they do exist. The Fifth Circuit's invalidation of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez focused considerably on the absence
of legislative findings and declared that courts "almost always" defer to
congressional findings: "Where Congress has made findings, formal or
informal, that regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the
courts must defer 'if there is any rational basis for' the finding .... Practically
speaking, such findings almost always end the matter."' Several decisions
in the wake of Lopez have approached congressional findings with a similar
level of deference, following the Fifth Circuit's rational basis standard. For
example, in distinguishing FACE from the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
Seventh Circuit maintained that although legislative findings are not technically
required, "[i]t is easy enough to imagine congressional findings that, if found
rational, could have made Lopez a very different case.... The point is that
congressional findings matter."112 Academic commentators have posited that
Lopez sent the message that the "'federalization of state crime can continue
without constitutional limit so long as there are legislative findings'. . . . The
Commerce Clause is not a real obstacle but an obligatory hoop."
'
"13
Although some lower courts and legal academics considering Congress's
Commerce Clause power after Lopez have adhered to the Fifth Circuit's
deferential standard, it appears that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Lopez majority set the stage for an approach that places considerably less
weight on legislative findings. Recall that the Lopez Court described
congressional findings as a supplementary aid that "would enable [the Court]
to evaluate the legislative judgment.""' In marked contrast to the Fifth
Circuit opinion, the Lopez Court treated legislative findings as an additional
110. See supra Section I.A.
111. United States v. Lopez, 2 F3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). aff'd. 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995).
112. United States v, wilson, 73 F.3d 675. 684 (7th Cir. 1995). Similart . in upholding a cocaine
distribution conspiracy statute against a Lopez challenge, the Second Circuit relied in large pan on the
presence of specific findings that local narcotics activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
See United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333. 1337 (2d Cir. 1996).
113. Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen. Note. Great Erpectatons: The Illusion ofFederalism
After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIs. 241, 263-64 (1996) (quoting Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad
Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of
State Crime, 43 KAN. L. REv. 503, 512 (1995)).
114. 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
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consideration, "one source of potential support for the proposition that the
statute had a rational connection to interstate commerce." 5 Nevertheless,
although Lopez suggests that legislative findings are not profoundly influential,
these findings are likely to assume greater importance in a close case, such as
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, where the activity's effect on interstate
commerce is not intuitively obvious or immediately apparent. In Lopez, Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the significance of legislative findings in view
of the fact that "no such substantial effect [on commerce] was visible to the
naked eye."' 6  In his Lopez dissent, Justice Breyer explained that
congressional findings offer "the benefit of some extra leeway," which "in
principle, might change the result in a close case."'" 7 Therefore, although the
presence of legislative findings accompanying the VAWA Remedy might not
be a dispositive factor, and although courts will exercise independent judgment
despite the existence of substantial findings, to dissenting Justice Souter,
legislative findings undoubtedly "shrink[] the risk that judicial research will
miss material scattered across the public domain or buried under pounds of
legislative record."" 8
Finally, the VAWA Remedy can be distinguished from the Gun-Free
School Zones Act on the ground that it is supported by an entirely separate
constitutional basis: Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy equal protection violations at the state level. The fact
that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is partially rooted in Congress's finding
that state systems nationwide have often failed victims of gender-motivated
violence bolsters the Commerce Clause claim that gender-motivated violence
is not a local issue suitable for state jurisdiction exclusively. The VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, is backed by a federal
interest apart from interstate commerce: a federal interest in ensuring that
victims of gender-motivated violence are afforded equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection issues at stake, described in the next Part, inform and
complement the Commerce Clause analysis because these unmistakably federal
115. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE NV. RE.SL. REv. 695, 707 (1996). Frickey also indicates that the Fifth
Circuit's approach finds no support in New Deal or post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases such as Jones
& Laughlin Steel, Wickard, and Katzenbach v. McClung. See id. at 711-13. Other legal academics have
agreed that the Lopez Court did not place significant emphasis on the presence or absence of congressional
findings. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading
of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 757, 772 (1996) ("Lopez was a decision squarely on
the merits. In other words, regardless of what findings Congress had adopted, the Lopez Court would not
have upheld the regulation of guns near schools as an exercise of the commerce power."). The Connecticut
court in Doe v. Doe also followed this less deferential approach to legislative findings: "While the Court's
inquiry is an independent one, it will consider congressional findings, including congressional committee
findings." 929 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Conn. 1996).
116. 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1656 (Souter J., dissenting)
(maintaining that legislative findings are particularly helpful in "difficult" or "close" cases).
118. Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Maloney, supra note 29, at 1931-32.
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issues add weight to the assertion that gender-motivated violence is a problem
that crosses state lines and affects the health and well-being of the entire
nation. In essence, Congress's invocation of both the Commerce Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause to remedy the problem of gender-motivated
violence sends the same message: Women have the right to full and equal
citizenship-both in terms of participation in the national economy and in
terms of protection by the criminal justice system.
1I. THE VAWA CiviL RIGHTS REMEDY AS A VALID ENFORCEMENT OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress relied on Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional basis for the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy." 9 Section Five provides that, "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20 In this instance, Congress aimed to enforce Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that, "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 2 ' Congress
invoked Section Five because it aimed to provide victims of gender-motivated
violence with equal protection of the laws where state systems had failed. The
potential assaults on Congress's authority to enact the Remedy under Section
Five are considerably less threatening than the post-Lopez Commerce Clause
challenges discussed above. Attacks on the Section Five basis of the Civil
Rights Remedy generally maintain that the Remedy's proscription of "purely
private conduct" violates the state action limit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Part argues that the VAWA Remedy falls within the judicially
circumscribed limits of Section Five because Section Five is not limited by the
same state action requirement as Section One. In reaching that conclusion, this
Part first describes the widespread gender inequality that pervades the state
criminal justice system, drawing on congressional hearings that indicate that
gender-motivated violence presents equal protection problems at the state level
that demand a federal remedy. The following Section then analyzes the extent
and limits of Congress's power under Section Five and argues that the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy fits comfortably within those limits. This Part further
maintains that the Civil Rights Remedy is "appropriate legislation" within the
meaning of Section Five because it is specifically tailored to combat the
critical problem of violence against women, and is therefore an effective means
of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). Note that Doe it Doe upheld the Ciril Rights Remedy on
Commerce Clause grounds only. The court did not reach the question of whether the Remedy could be
sustained on the basis of Section Five as well. See 929 F Supp. at 612 n.5.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
121. Id. § 1.
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A. Inequality in the State System
Congress enacted the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy based on an extensive
legislative record that documented the many ways in which state courts do not
afford female crime victims equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gender bias and discrimination
within the state system frequently deprive women of the protection to which
they are entitled. 122 As Senator Biden described the problem on introducing
the VAWA Remedy to Congress: "[I]t is still easier to convict a car thief than
a rapist, and, authorities are more likely to arrest a man for parking tickets than
for beating his wife . . ,,t21 This Section summarizes the statistics, reports,
and testimony gathered at the VAWA congressional hearings and concludes
that because of the states' failure to provide equal protection to victims of
gender-motivated violence, Congress had legitimate cause for creating the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
Obstacles to equal treatment for female victims of violence within the state
system exist at both legal and administrative levels. On a legal level, state
statute books are rife with formal bars to equality. For example, some states
still retain a marital exemption to laws prohibiting rape; 24 several states also
heighten the legal standards for proving sexual assault against cohabitants and
dating companions."'z Another legal barrier to equality is the interspousal
immunity doctrine, which in some states still prevents battered women from
suing their husbands to recover damages for either medical expenses or pain
and suffering. 26 Strict statutes of limitations, yet another legal obstacle in
122. See generally Hallock, supra note 16, at 595-99 (describing formal and informal barriers to
gender equality in state criminal justice systems); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1530-43 (1993) (hereinafter Developments] (indicating insufficiency
of recent state reforms in civil and criminal laws, arrest and prosecution policies, and sentencing and
treatment programs).
123. 137 CONG. REc. S597-98 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Biden).
124. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (1991). Although most states no longer have marital rape
exemptions, four states-Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina-have retained them. See
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (Michie Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43 (West Supp. 1996)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § I111 (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1997). A substantial number of states that have abolished the marital rape exemption, however, still treat
marital rape differently from nonmarital rape. These states either impose lesser penalties on perpetrators
of marital rape, compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (establishing that sexual
assault in first degree is punishable by imprisonment of not less than 15 nor more than 35 years), with id.
§ 61-8B-6 (establishing that sexual assault of spouse, while still felony, is punishable by imprisonment of
not less than two nor more than ten years), or create higher legal standards for proving marital rape than
for proving nonmarital rape, compare, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(l)(a) (1972 & Supp. 1996)
(defining sexual battery as sexual penetration of another person without his or her consent), with id. § 97-3-
99 (providing that spouse of alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery only if spouse engaged
in forcible sexual penetration without consent of alleged victim). For an overview of the history of the
marital rape exemption and each state's current approach to spousal rape, see Emily R. Brown, Note,
Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel (?!); Hear Me Roar, 18 AMo. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 657
(1995).
125. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 774-75 (1995).
126. See LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMEsTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLIcr AND
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some states, pose particular problems for young victims of sexual assault, who
permanently lose their opportunity to pursue a civil remedy if they fail to bring
suit within a few years of the attack.
27
In addition to marital rape exemptions, interspousal tort immunities, and
statutes of limitations, which restrict the availability of prosecution for gender-
motivated crimes, there are also discriminatory laws that obstruct justice at the
trial level. For example, state rape shield laws do not apply in civil cases, so
that "women bringing tort actions for sexual assault are routinely subjected to
intrusive questions about consensual sexual activity unrelated to the
attack."'" Furthermore, most jurisdictions still adhere to the common la%%
"fresh complaint rule," which creates a rebuttable presumption against the
credibility of rape complaints that are not filed immediately after the alleged
assault.129 Although study after study shows that delays in reporting are to
be expected because of the trauma caused by sexual assault." the fresh
complaint rule is still used to identify false reports. Along similar lines, pattern
jury instructions used in state courts nationwide require that juries be reminded
of the ever-present possibility of false reporting.' 3' Even the Model Penal
Code suggests that juries in sexual assault cases "be instructed to evaluate the
testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the
emotional involvement of the witness and the difficult)' of determining the
truth [of the allegation].' ' 2
These legal barriers to equality are compounded by discriminatory
administrative practices, which undermine whatever protection is provided by
the letter of state law. Congressional hearings on the VAWA Remedy showed
that gender bias contaminates every level of the state system, and that
insensitive and unresponsive treatment by police, prosecutors, and judges often
results in low reporting and conviction rates. Police, responsible for the initial
screening of cases, are notorious for not responding to situations involving
violence against women, particularly domestic violence. The Fund for the
Feminist Majority reported at the VAWA legislative hearings that "23% of
SEXUAL ABUSE § 1.16 (1995) (cataloging status of interspousal ummunity doctinne in cach state)
127. In New York, for example, the statute of limitations for intentional torts such as assault and
battery is one year. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3) (Consol. 1990). See generally NOW LEGAL DEF i-NsE A.ND
EDUC. FUND, LEGAL RESOURCE KIT: INCEST AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1996) (descnbing ho". statutes
of limitations impose unique burdens on minors and cataloguing state statutes of limitations for civil incest
and child sexual abuse cases).
128. Crimes of Violence, supra note 1. at 9 (statement of Sally Goldfarb. Senior Staff Attorney. NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund). Consider. for example, one case in Iowa where the "utal judge
authorized the defense lawyer to ask the victim ... aboui her "tlegirimate' relationship to her boyinriend
and use of birth control, and about her reputation of having wild parties' with a lot of men 'coming and
going."' S. REP. 102-197, at 46 (1991) (quoting unpublished opinion in Sndelar 1 Weiner. Ci' No 89-
1177 (Iowa)).
129. See Morrson Torrey, W Wen 1111 We Be Believed? Rape Ali-tirs and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-43 (1991)
130. See id. at 1016 n.10.
131. See id. at 1046.
132. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980).
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women who decline from reporting their being raped to the police do so
because they thought the police would be inefficient, ineffective, or
insensitive."'' 33 An internal investigation of the Oakland, California Police
Department found that ninety percent of the sexual assault reports that were
determined to be unfounded in 1989 and 1990 should have been further
investigated.' 34 The Oakland investigation further discovered that one out of
every four women who reported a rape or attempted rape to the Oakland Police
during those years was ignored.
35
Equally problematic is the well-documented fact that prosecutors often fail
to enforce vigorously laws prohibiting gender-motivated violence. As one
commentator described: "Faced with limited time, personnel, and resources...
prosecutors often give domestic violence cases low priority and sometimes
even try to persuade battered women not to prosecute."'' 36 At the
congressional hearings on the Civil Rights Remedy, it was readily apparent
that prosecutors across the country either refuse to charge or significantly
undercharge alleged perpetrators of sex crimes:
Witnesses told of counties in which no acquaintance rape prosecutions
had been brought .... They quoted from Justice Department studies
showing that most domestic violence cases caused injuries as serious
as most felonies and, yet, experience demonstrated that most domestic
violence crimes were charged as misdemeanors. They testified about
threats to witnesses routinely prosecuted in drug cases but ignored in
domestic abuse cases.
13 7
In fact, a civil rights case that will be decided by the Supreme Court this
Term offers a paradigmatic illustration of state prosecutors' unwillingness to
bring charges in cases of alleged sexual assault. The case, United States v.
Lanier,'38 involves a Tennessee Chancery Court judge ultimately convicted
in federal court of sexually assaulting five women on five separate occasions
in his chambers, at times dressed in his judicial robes. One of Judge Lanier's
victims was a litigant with a child custody matter before his court; the other
four victims were court employees or women who worked with the judge in
133. Crimes of Violence, supra note I, at 118 (statement of the Fund for the Feminist Majority,
Gender Balance in the Police Force: Responding to Violence Against Women) (citing CATHERINE WOLF,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VIciMs OF VIOLENT CRIME (1991)).
134. See id. (citing Police Were Wrong in Rapes, Chief Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1991).
135. See id. There is a considerable amount of anecdotal and statistical evidence of police failure to
protect female victims of violence. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1525-26
(D. Conn. 1984) (stating that husband stabbed wife repeatedly, then kicked and threatened her while police
were present); DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 90-99 (1976); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER
239 (1989).
136. Developments, supra note 122, at 1540.
137. Nourse, supra note 15, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
138. 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), which proscribes
constitutional violations committed under color of state law, does not encompass sexual assault by state
judge acting in official capacity), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
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his official capacity. But because Judge Lanier's brother was the county
prosecutor, and because his family had "occupied positions of power and
political authority in Dyersburg, Dyer County, Tennessee, for several
generations ,'39 it is doubtful that his criminal conduct would ever have been
prosecuted in state court. 40 In the end, Judge Lanier's sexual assaults were
only exposed and federally prosecuted because of an unrelated federal
investigation into suspected political corruption involving Judge Lanier and his
brother.'4' The facts of the Lanier case vividly support the claim that because
of local affiliations and prejudices, state prosecutors often fail to enforce
criminal protections against gender-based violence.
Gender bias exists among state court judges as well. For example, the
Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts reported that
nearly one "quarter of the [state judges] believed that rape victims 'sometimes'
or 'frequently' precipitate their sexual assaults because of what they wear
and/or actions preceding the incidents."'4 2 One state court judge told a
domestic violence victim seeking protection in his court, "'Let's kiss and make
up and get out of my court.""14' The New York State Task Force found that
some judges "shunt victims back and forth between police and family court
until they give up seeking protection."'"
B. The Reach of Congress's Enforcement Power
In the face of this evidence demonstrating that state justice systems
discriminate against female victims of violence at every level, some remain
convinced that state courts afford victims of gender-motivated violence equal
protection of the laws. For example, one law professor has argued that because
violence against women "is already adequately covered by state law," the
VAWA Remedy is a "wasteful duplication of resources."'45 Most critics,
however, do not contest the extensive findings of widespread bias in the state
court system,'- 6 but instead argue that as an antidote to this inequity, the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy exceeds Congress's power under Section Five
139. Id. at 1394 (Wellford, J., concumng in part and dissenting in pan).
140. See DARCY O'BRIEN, THE Po\%rER TO HuRT (1996) (documenting enure history of investigation
and prosecution of Lanier case).
141. See id.
142. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 47 n.63 (1991).
143. Quoted in Women and Violence: Hearing on Legislanon to Reduce the Growing Problem of
Violent Crime Against Women Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Part 1). 101st Cong 65 (1990)
144. Id. (citing Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts. The Task Force
Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 283-84 (1987)).
145. Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalzation. 46 HASNGS LJ 1247. 1249
(1995).
146. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ.. 935 F. Supp. 779. 800 (W.D Va.
1996) ("Some possibility exists that at least part of the states' differential treatment of gender-based violent
crimes against women is due to gender discrimination, and so correcting the differential re tment ansing
out of gender discrimination is a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern.").
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to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'47 This
Section defends the Civil Rights Remedy's Section Five basis, maintaining that
the Remedy does not exceed the established limits of Congress's authority
under Section Five.
Although case law describing Congress's power to enforce the terms of the
Civil War Amendments is minimal, it uniformly demonstrates that legislative
enforcement power can reach beyond the limits of the self-executing provisions
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Jurisprudence
concerning congressional enforcement power began its serious development in
the 1960s, following a proliferation of congressional legislation protecting civil
rights. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 48 the Court upheld a provision of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that suspended literacy tests, despite the fact
that a unanimous Court had rejected a facial challenge to literacy tests seven
years earlier 49 In a decision extraordinarily deferential to Congress's
enforcement power, the Court granted Congress the freedom to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of a racially unconditioned right to vote as
it saw fit; Congress would not be constrained by the Court's own notion of
what constituted a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court broadly
stated that, "Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition against racial discrimination in voting" as long as Congress
"attack[s] evils ... comprehended by the Fifteenth Amendment."' 50 The
Katzenbach Court further announced that it would review congressional
exercise of its enforcement power according to a generous "rational basis"
standard.'5 ' In essence, the Court made clear that Congress in its
enforcement capacity could legislate against conduct that would not in and of
itself qualify as a violation of the self-executing provision of the Fifteenth
Amendment.'52
147. See, e.g., id. at 793-801.
148. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
149. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
150. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
151. See id. at 324. Other decisions reviewing congressional enforcement legislation have invoked the
Karzenbach "rational basis" standard. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156. 177 (1980)
(Fifteenth Amendment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,440 (1968) (Thirteenth Amendment).
Note that this deferential standard is akin to the one used in Commerce Clause cases such as Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Also note that in determining whether a rational basis
existed for Congress's enactment, the McClung Court was persuaded by the fact that there was a
"voluminous legislative history" supporting the enactment. See 379 U.S. at 309. As described in Section
II.A, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy also has a "voluminous legislative history" demonstrating that
Congress had a rational basis supporting this effort to enforce equal protection.
152. City of Rome offers a more recent statement of this holding. See 446 U.S. at 177 ("It is clear...
that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do
not violate § I of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are
'appropriate'....").
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With respect to congressional legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment, the leading case is Katzenbach it Morgan, which upheld a
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that nullified New York's English
literacy requirement. Following the pattern and logic of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Court approved the statute despite its own determination in a
previous case that the New York literacy requirement did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause itself. Invoking the deferential Katzenbach standard of
review, the Morgan Court was satisfied with the legislation at issue simply
because it was "able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might
resolve the conflict as it did."' According to the Morgan Court, "[c]orrectly
viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 55
Katzenbach and Morgan stand for the proposition that the range of conduct
that Congress is permitted to legislate against pursuant to its enforcement
power surpasses the scope of activity that would constitute a violation of the
self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. As
constitutional law scholar Burt Neuborne explained at the VAWA
congressional hearings: "[Tihe modem Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that
Congress' power under Section 5 exceeds the self-executing reach of Section
1.''156 Recently, in upholding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
153. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
154. Id. at 653.
155. Id. at 651 (emphasis added). A plurality of the Court affirmed the principles of Morgan in the
affirmative action context in City ofRiclunond v J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
stating' "Congress... has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which
Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those
situations." Id. at 490; see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547. 605-06 (1990) (O'Connor. J.
dissenting) ("Congress has considerable latitude, presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it
exercises its 'unique remedial powers... under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omtted,
(ellipsis in original). The Court's opinion in Adarand Constructors. Inc. : Pena. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
a more recent affirmative action decision, did not impact or modify the Croson Court's statements regarding
Section Five. See id. at 2114 ("It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of
the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress ... and the extent to which courts
should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority.... We need not. and do not. address these differences
today.").
The Morgan Court made clear that the only substantial restriction on Congress's Section Five
authority is that enforcement legislation cannot retract or reduce Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,
"Section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment: § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" its protecuons. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. This limitation
clearly does not pertain to the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. Congress's remedy for gendcr-motivated
violence in no way aims to "restrict, abrogate. or dilute" the equal protecuon guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment-it only aims to enhance those guarantees.
156. Crimes of Violence, supra note I, at 45 (statement of Burt Neubore. Professor of Law. New
York University); see also id. at 63 (statement of Cass R. Sunstem. Professor of Law. University of
Chicago). Legal scholars generally agree that Congress acting under Section Five can step beyond the
judicially defined limits of Section One. See, e.g.. Robert A. Burt. Miranda and Title II. A Morganatc
Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 84 ("The Court is suggesting that. to some extent at least. § 5 exempts
the Fourteenth Amendment from the principle of Court-Congress relationships expressed by Marbuy %,
Madison, that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constituuon."); Archibald Cox. The
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(RFRA) 57 against claims that its enactment transgressed the boundaries of
Section Five, federal appellate courts have confirmed that Congress's Section
Five power can reach beyond the parameters of Section One. 58
According to critics of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, the Remedy is
unconstitutional because it exceeds the well-defined scope of Section One; they
argue that the Remedy's proscription of "purely private conduct" violates the
state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Brzonkala court
stated in rejecting the Section Five ground of the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy: "[R]emedying private individuals' gender-based crimes is not a
legitimate equal protection goal due to the fact that no sufficient state contacts
exist."' 59 The Brzonkala court, however, conflated the sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the court repeatedly cited Section One cases for the
proposition that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy surpasses the bounds of
Section Five. 60  In discussing these two Sections as if they were
interchangeable, the Brzonkala Court misconstrued Supreme Court precedent
that indicates that Section One and Section Five differ in kind and in
scope. 16' As cases like Katzenbach and Morgan demonstrate, in determining
the appropriate means of enforcing Section One, Congress is not constrained
by judicially proscribed definitions of actionable conduct under Section One.
In essence, congressional legislation under Section Five is not restricted to the
regulation of activities that in and of themselves would constitute violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. Congress therefore has the discretion under
Section Five to legislate against private acts of gender-motivated violence,
although those private acts would not be actionable under Section One, as long
Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 257-59 (1971) (explaining that
limiting Congress's Section Five powers to scope of Section One would defeat purpose of enforcement
clause and would only enable Congress to replicate what judiciary is bound to do); Bradford Russell Clark,
Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1969, 1975 (1984) (maintaining that Congress is entitled "to exercise broad discretion to
forge remedies in the equal protection context, largely unimpeded by court intervention"); Matt Pawa,
Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An
Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1056 (1993) (positing
that under Section Five, "Congress must give force to constitutional rights beyond the perimeters of those
rights as defined by the Court").
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Act reinstated the "strict scrutiny" test for free exercise of
religion claims, thereby explicitly overturning the Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 972 (1990), and rejecting the less stringent standard of review adopted in that case. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a).
158. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding RFRA as
constitutionally viable under Section Five and explaining that Congress did not exceed its Section Five
powers if legislation at issue "is reasonably designed to secure a right created by the Fourteenth
Amendment itself'); Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1356-61 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
293 (1996) (stating that Morgan "remains the benchmark" and upholding RFRA because Congress intended
to enforce religious liberty protected from state infringement by Fourteenth Amendment).
159. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 799-800 (W.D. Va. 1996).
160. See id. at 797-99 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947)).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
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as those acts are rationally related to the end of enforcing Section One, which
prohibits state deprivations of equal protection.
The Brzonkala court's argument that "no sufficient state contacts exist" is
flawed in several respects. First, no Supreme Court case suggests that Congress
is not constitutionally permitted to reach "purely private conduct" under
Section Five when the regulation of private conduct is rationally related to the
goal of securing citizens' right to equal protection by the government. In fact,
dicta in several Supreme Court cases intimates that Congress is in fact allowed
to regulate activities that would not qualify as state action, as long as
Congress's overall purpose is to remedy state deprivations of equal protection.
Consider, for example, United States i. Guest,162 where six Justices agreed
that Congress's authority under Section Five is not constrained by the state
action principle that applies to Section One case law.163 As Justice Brennan
stated in his separate opinion in Guest:
I acknowledge that some of the decisions of this Court ... have
declared that Congress' power under § 5 is confined to the adoption
of "appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of... prohibited
State laws and State acts .... I do not accept-and a majority of the
Court today rejects-this interpretation of § 5. It reduces the
legislative power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment to that
of the judiciary; and it attributes a far too limited objective to the
Amendment's sponsors.
I can find no principle of federalism nor word of the
Constitution that denies Congress power to determine that in order
adequately to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it
is also appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers
themselves and not [those] acting in concert with state officers-who
engage in the same brutal conduct for the same misguided
purpose. 64
A majority of the Court in Guest was convinced that to enforce the dictates of
Section One, Congress must have the power to legislate against purely private
conduct if necessary and appropriate in the specific instance. In another
Supreme Court decision, District of Columbia v. Carter, '6 a unanimous
Court stated in a footnote that Congress may indeed have the authority under
Section Five to reach "purely private conduct": To say that "[tihe Fourteenth
Amendment itself 'erects no shield against merely private conduct' ... is not
to say ... that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under § 5
162. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
163. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Guest required some showing of public involvement in order
to sustain a congressional exercise of Section Five power. See id. at 754-57 (plurality opinion).
164. Id at 782-84 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). The six
Justices maintaining that Congress can reach private conduct under Section Five were Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black. Douglas, Clark, Brennan, and Fortas.
165. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 66 In view of the ambiguity of case law on
the subject, Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe stated in his treatise on
constitutional law that the question of whether Congress can regulate "purely
private conduct" under Section Five remains unanswered. Professor Tribe
explained that, "the Court has had no occasion to confront the extent to which
the state action requirement limits congressional power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment."' 67 Because the issue of whether Congress can reach
"purely private conduct" is yet unresolved, it is incorrect for the Brzonkala
court and other challengers of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy to assume that
Congress has exceeded its authority under Section Five in legislating against
private acts of gender-motivated violence in an effort to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause.
Of course, it is important to recognize that although Congress appears free
to regulate "purely private conduct," there must exist "sufficient state contacts"
so that the regulation truly remedies state denials of equal protection. In the
Civil Rights Cases,168 one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions
establishing the extent of Congress's power under Section Five to enforce the
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court invalidated several sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which, without "reference whatever to any
supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part
of the States,"'169  required that states provide all citizens equal
accommodation and privileges at inns, public conveyances, and places of
public amusement. The Court struck down the statute because it had no
apparent connection to state action of any kind:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or
judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a
crime of that individual ... if not sanctioned in some way by the
State .... 170
Because the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is rooted in state denials of equal
protection, it meets the standard established in the Civil Rights Cases.
Although the VAWA Remedy reaches the "wrongful acts of individuals," its
legislative history demonstrates that the granting of a remedy for those
166. Id. at 423-24 & 424 n.8 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 384 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
167. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 351 (2d ed. 1988). Note that
even the Brzonkala court conceded: "Some authority indicates that Congress may address purely private
conduct via § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in spite of the fact that § I actions require state action."
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 794 (W.D. Va. 1996).
168. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
169. Id. at 14.
170. Id. at 17.
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wrongful acts is predicated on laws and customs that do not effectively protect
victims of gender-motivated violence.' Because states have failed to
provide and administer laws to safeguard female crime victims, private acts of
gender-motivated violence are undoubtedly, in the words of the Civil Rights
Cases Court, "sanctioned in some way by the state."'7 2
The inquiry as to whether Congress exceeded its Section Five powers does
not end here, however. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
states that Congress has the power to enforce Section One by "appropriate
legislation.' '173 The Morgan Court, following the McCulloch v. Maryland""
standard, interpreted this provision to include legislation that is "'plainly
adapted' to furthering the[] aims of the Equal Protection Clause."'" As the
following discussion makes clear, there is no question that the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy is "appropriate legislation" within the meaning given by the
Morgan Court.
Several aspects of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy illustrate the fact that
the statute was specifically designed to remedy equal protection problems.
First, the Remedy appropriately addresses the type of violence most frequently
suffered by women. It is well established that most violence against women
occurs in private and is perpetrated by people known to the victim. 17 6 In
contrast to race-based discrimination, acts of gender-motivated violence are not
usually committed under color of state law' 77 or by a conspiracy of
171. See infra Section II.A.
172. 109 U.S. at 17.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
174. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
175. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641. 651-52 (1966). One academic commentator describing the
Morgan standard for "appropriate legislation" explained that "the Court should accord Congress broad
discretion to pursue its chosen means. Only when Congress has clearly mistaken the effectiveness of its
means for furthering valid ends should the Court strike down Congress' selected remedy." Clark, supra note
156, at 1986.
176. According to the Department of Justice's most recent National Crime Victimizaton Survey.
approximately 75% of all lone-offender violence against women is perpetrated by an offender whom the
victim knows. See BACHMAN & SALTZMAN, supra note 3, at I. Furthermore. in 29% of all violence against
women by a lone offender, the perpetrator is a husband. ex-husband. boyfriend. or ex-boyfriend--an
intimate. See id.; see also Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practatoners. J AM. MED.
ASS'N, June 17, 1992, at 34 (reporting that women are more likely to be assaulted, raped, or killed b)
current or former male partners than by all other types of assailants combined, and that victims of violence
by intimates are much more likely to be reassaulted within six months than victims of violence by
nonintimates).
177. Section 1983 provides a civil rights cause of action against every person who, acting under color
of state law, deprives a citizen of "any rights. privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). In addition to, and prior to the existence of. the VAWvA Civil Rights
Remedy, a victim of gender-motivated violence could bring a section 1983 suit in response to a state law
or policy that denied her equal protection of the laws. In Personnel Adminstrator of Massachusetts v
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), however, the Court held that a plaintiff alleging that a facially neutral state
law or policy discriminates on the basis of gender must prove the existence of a deliberate intent to
discriminate. See id. at 274. Because discriminatory purpose ts so difficult to establish. section 1983 has
not been an effective means of challenging state laws and practices that discriminate against women. See.
e.g., Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that statistics establishing that victims
of domestic violence were treated differently than victims of other violence with respect to type of police
response and likelihood that arrest would be made did not show section 1983 equal protecuon violation
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wrongdoers. 78 Because existing civil rights laws were drafted primarily to
address the problem of racial discrimination, these laws do not respond in any
significant way to the problem of gender-motivated violence. As
Representative Patricia Schroeder explained at the VAWA legislative hearings:
"Gender motivated violence cannot be adequately affected by existing civil
rights structures because gender crimes manifest themselves differently than
other crimes-they tend to be acts by individuals."'79 Clearly, a meaningful
and effective civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence must
reach violence committed by individuals acting in a private capacity. Because
the VAWA Remedy is the first civil rights statute to recognize what constitutes
the most common and devastating threat to women's equal citizenship, it is
true to its purpose of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.
The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy also effectively remedies the problem
of equal protection at the state level by simply offering an alternative, less
biased forum for victims of gender-motivated violence. First, plaintiffs bringing
suit in federal court do not have to contend with unjust and outmoded laws,
such as the marital rape exemption and the fresh complaint rule, which still
exist in a number of states.80 Second, although gender discrimination
undoubtedly exists in the federal system as well, there is evidence that female
victims of violence have received fairer treatment in federal court.)8' The
very fact that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy offers a federal forum for
victims of gender-motivated violence, along with the fact that the Remedy
specifically addresses the most frequent and harmful kind of violence against
women, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the VAWA Remedy is
absent evidence showing impermissible discriminatory intent); Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178,
181-82 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding interspousal immunity doctrine against equal protection challenge). Legal
academics have noted that section 1983 is an inadequate solution to the problem of gender-motivated
violence. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 122, at 1567-71 (describing difficulties of bringing gender-
based equal protection claims under Feeney standard).
178. Section 1985 provides federal civil rights protection against a "[c]onspiracy to interfere with civil
rights." 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994). The 1995 National Crime Victimization Survey reports that only 16% of
violent victimizations against women are committed by multiple offenders. See BACHMAN & SALTZMAN,
supra note 3, at 2. In comparison, 27% of violent victimizations against men are perpetrated by multiple
offenders. See id.
179. Crimes of Violence, supra note I, at 95 (statement of Rep. Schroeder); see also id. at 10
(statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attomey, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) (explaining
that VAWA Remedy is necessary "because gender-based violence typically differs from the types of racial
violence directed against men"); Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic
& Ignored, II LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 44-53 (1992) (arguing that existing civil rights remedies fail to protect
battered women); Hallock, supra note 16, at 592 ("The civil rights legislation currently in force in the
United States is inadequate for addressing the problem of violent gender-based discrimination ... .
180. See supra text accompanying notes 124-32.
181. See 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 30 (reporting that "the federal
courts are relatively free of the kind of blatant sexism [women] have encountered in some state courts");
Hallock, supra note 16, at 601 ("[A]s with civil rights legislation aimed at protecting racial minorities, it
is fair to assume that the federal system would provide litigants a better opportunity to assert their rights
than would state courts.").
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"appropriate legislation" to further the aims of the Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
iI. CONCLUSION
Gender-motivated violence is a federal problem that warrants a federal
solution. Although the constitutional bases of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
have been and are expected to be fiercely contested, Congress most likely
acted within its authority under both the Commerce Clause and Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because gender-motivated violence deeply
affects interstate commerce, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy should survive
the ambiguous threat posed by Lopez. Moreover, the VAWA Remedy is firmly
supported on another constitutional ground: It is an appropriate and effective
means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, and fits within the scope of
Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If gender-motivated violence continues unabated by a federal remedy,
women will continue to be deprived of their full citizenship rights. State law
as currently enforced does not provide victims of gender-motivated violence
the full rights of citizenship; victims are frequently denied equal protection of
the laws by many state criminal justice systems. Moreover, unassisted victims
of violence cannot participate on an equal basis in the national economy; their
contribution to interstate commerce decreases and consequently, in Sally
Goldfarb's words, "our entire society is diminished."' 8- As two parts of the
same equation, the Commerce Clause and Section Five bases of the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy are both necessary and appropriate means of achieving
full and equal citizenship.
182. See Crimes of Violence, supra note 1, at 8.
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